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In the wake of the result of the UK’s referendum to leave the European Union, the All 
Party Parliamentary Group on Modern Languages has called for domestic legislation 
to replicate the provisions of the European Directive on the Right to Interpretation 
and Translation in Criminal Proceedings, which promotes compliance with Arts. 5 
and 6 ECHR. This article examines the Directive’s provisions and asks, does the 
Directive make a difference, and what would be lost if it ceased to have effect in the 
UK? It argues that although the Directive is unlikely to achieve procedural 
harmonisation, in part due to drafting flaws, it has value in that it encourages 
language rights in criminal proceedings, in the cause of trial fairness, to be taken 
seriously.  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Among the flurry of responses by the political community to the outcome of the referendum 
of 23rd June 2016 on Britain’s membership of the European Union, one might have easily 
escaped the notice of most interested observers. The report of the All Party Parliamentary 
Group on Modern Languages on “Brexit and Languages”, published on 17 October 2016, is a 
plea to the government to protect language skills in the UK, and lists specific objectives that 
should be safeguarded during the Brexit negotiations.1 The report’s conclusion is that there 
should be measures in place, in the field of education in particular, to ensure that the UK has 
sufficient linguists at its service that it can participate effectively in world trade and 
international relations. Also in the wish list is a call for the government, “to legislate to 
replicate the rights enshrined in the 2010 European Directive on the Right to Interpretation 
and Translation in Criminal Proceedings”.  
 What is so special about this EU directive and what exactly are these rights that 
require replicating in domestic law? The European Union’s (EU) Directive on the Right to 
Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings (henceforth referred to as the 
Directive) has sought to establish common standards in legal interpreting and translation in 
                                                 
* I am grateful to the Editor and the anonymous referee for their comments. Remaining errors are my own.  
1 All-Party Parliamentary Group on Modern Languages, Brexit and Languages: A Checklist for Government 
Negotiators and Officials, 17 October 2016. See: 
https://www.britishcouncil.org/education/schools/support-for-languages/thought-leadership/appg/news/brexit-
languages; appgmfl-mflbrexit_oct16 [Accessed 21 January 2017].  
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criminal proceedings within the EU that will ensure consistent observation of the fair trial 
rights contained in Arts. 5 and 6 ECHR.2 The Directive was adopted on 20 October 2010, and 
entered into force on 27 October 2013.3 This article sets out the principal elements of the 
Directive and examines its significance in the broader context of international and European 
language rights jurisprudence. It also considers the recent judgements of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) in interpreting its provisions, judgements which underline the 
potential difficulties in achieving common standards of interpretation and translation in 
criminal proceedings throughout the EU. It asks, what would be lost if, as a result of Brexit, 
the Directive would cease to have effect in the UK?  
 
 
The Directive’s Objectives 
 
The Directive has two primary objectives. First of all, it is a contributor to the EU’s agenda to 
promote mutual recognition and common standards in criminal proceedings.4 Trans-
jurisdictional cooperation in criminal proceedings within the EU is a key policy objective,5 
and a means of “strengthening mutual trust” between member states.6 Without doubt, 
achieving procedural harmonisation and common safeguards in criminal proceedings within 
the entire EU zone is an ambitious goal.7 The Directive’s second objective is to implement 
the EU Council’s roadmap8 that aims to strengthen the procedural rights of suspected or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings in the interests of trial fairness.9 The Directive 
addresses the objectives of measure A of the EU Council’s roadmap.10 
The Directive’s provisions replicate the language rights protected by Arts. 5 and 6 
ECHR, which provide the conceptual basis for the Directive’s provisions.11 Art. 5 ECHR 
guarantees the right of arrested persons to understand the reasons for arrest and any charge 
laid against them.12 Art. 6 ensures that, where the suspect or accused does not speak the 
language of the proceedings, there will be an interpreter provided. Art. 6 guarantees the right 
                                                 
2 Directive 2010/64/EU, adopted on 20 October 2010 in accordance with Article 288 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.  
3 Although the Directive applies to interpreters for blind or deaf persons, the focus here will be on its linguistic 
aspects, as it was those which concerned the parliamentary group in its report. For general observations on the 
role and influence of court interpreters on the course of a criminal trial, see Susan Berk-Seligson, The Bilingual 
Courtroom: Court Interpreters and the Judicial Process (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990). 
4 Directive 2010/64/EU, preamble, para. 2.  
5 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, 15-16 October 1999. 
6 Directive 2010/64/EU, preamble, para 7.  
7 For commentary, see Jacqueline S. Hodgson, “Safeguarding Suspects' Rights in Europe: A Comparative 
Perspective” (2011) 14 (4) New Criminal Law Review, pp. 611-665. 
8 Resolution of the EU Council on a Roadmap for Strengthening Procedural Rights of Suspected or Accused 
Persons in Criminal Proceedings, 30 November 2009 (2009/C 295/01). The procedural rights roadmap called 
for the adoption of measures regarding the right to translation and interpretation (measure A), the right to 
information on rights and information about the charges (measure B), the right to legal advice and legal aid 
(measure C), the right to communication with relatives, employers and consular authorities (measure D), and 
special safeguards for suspected or accused persons who are vulnerable (measure E). 
9 Directive 2010/64/EU, preamble, para 10. 
10 For commentary on the procedural safeguards in general, see Laurens Van Puyenbroeck and Gert Vermeulen 
“Towards Minimum Procedural Guarantees for the Defence in Criminal Proceedings in the EU” (2011) 60 (4) 
I.C.L.Q., pp. 1017-1038. 
11 All EU member states are, of course, signatories to the EHCR, a requirement for any state who applies to join 
the EU. Conversely, membership of the EU is not a pre-requisite for being a signatory of the ECHR and a 
member of the Council of Europe. For example, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland are members of the Council 
of Europe, and have ratified the ECHR, yet are not members of the EU.  
12 ECHR, Art. 5(2).  
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of the individual charged with a criminal offence to be informed of the accusation in “a 
language which he understands”13 and the right “to have the free assistance of an interpreter 
if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court”.14 The European Court of 
Human Rights has emphasized the right to free assistance and that the suspect should not bear 
the cost of the interpreter’s services.15  
The phrase “everyone charged with a criminal offence” in Art. 6 does not mean that 
the provisions of the article apply only after a charge has been laid. The article applies to the 
entire proceedings, including the early investigative stages, when the suspect has been 
arrested and questioned but not yet charged, and should be read conjunctively with Art. 5.16 
The European Court of Human Rights made some important findings with regard to the 
proper interpretation and application of Art. 6 in Kamasinski v. Austria.17  In this case, it held 
that the courts have a responsibility to secure the attendance of the interpreter, and a duty to 
oversee the adequacy of the interpretation, so that the right guaranteed by Art. 6(3) (e) can be 
effective.18 The Court also held that the right to the free assistance of an interpreter applies 
not only to oral statements made at the trial hearing but also to documentary material and the 
pre-trial proceedings.19 Of particular relevance to this analysis is that a suspect has the right 
to: 
 
“the free assistance of an interpreter for the translation or interpretation of all those 
documents or statements in the proceedings instituted against him which it is 
necessary for him to understand or to have rendered into the court’s language in order 
to have the benefit of a fair trial.”20  
  
The court elaborated by stating that although this does not mean a written translation of all 
documents, it should be sufficient, “to enable the defendant to have knowledge of the case 
against him and to defend himself, notably by being able to put before the court his version of 
the events.”21 The significance of this interpretation of Art. 6(3)(e) by the European Court of 
Human Rights in view of the recent judgements of the CJEU in connection with the Directive 
will become clearer later in this article.  
 
 
The Directive and the Right to Interpretation 
 
Art. 2 of the Directive deals with a suspect or defendant’s right to interpretation.22 It requires 
that when the suspected or accused person does not speak or understand the language of the 
proceedings, interpretation should be provided throughout the entire process.23 This includes 
during police questioning, interim hearings and at trial.24 Interpretation should also be 
                                                 
13 ECHR Art. 6 (3) (a). 
14 ECHR Art. 6 (3) (e).  
15 See, for example, Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc v. Germany, (1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 149.  
16 See Engel and others v. Netherlands, (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 647.  
17 Kamasinski v. Austria [1989] ECHR 24, 9783/82; (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 36 
18 Kamasinski v. Austria, para 79.  
19 Kamasinski v. Austria, para 74.  
20 Kamasinski v. Austria, para 74. 
21 Kamasinski v. Austria, para 74. 
22 Art. 2.7 states that, in connection with the execution of a European arrest warrant, arrested persons should be 
provided with interpretation. 
23 See, also, Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 2.1. 
24 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 2.1. 
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available for lawyer-client meetings.25 The right to interpretation thus encompasses the 
defendant’s capability properly to mount his defence, and it includes information which the 
defendant wishes to impart to the relevant prosecuting authority. 
In practice, the police and/or court service will bear responsibility for compliance 
with Art. 2.2.26 Art. 2.4 requires mechanisms to establish the accused or suspect’s linguistic 
proficiency and determine if an interpreter is required.27 The Directive provides no guidance 
on the detail of such mechanisms, although establishing fluency in a language is not a simple 
matter. A suspect’s grasp of what may be a second or third language will vary, and factors 
that can affect fluency include intelligence, aptitude, the stage in life when a language is 
learnt (with children having a greater propensity to master other languages) 28 and a host of 
socio-economic and cultural factors.29 Even proficiency in a first language can be 
problematic for members of certain social groups, especially those from groups which are 
socially or economically disadvantaged.30 Language difficulties for certain vulnerable 
individuals can be at their most acute in an intimidating or hostile environment, such as a 
police station or courtroom.31 Assumptions that a person may be ‘educated’ or ‘intelligent’, 
and thus does not require any assistance from an interpreter or translator should be 
appropriately tested and measured.32 As a further safeguard, Art. 2.5 requires that procedures 
must be in place whereby the suspect or accused can challenge any refusal to grant the 
assistance of an interpreter, or challenge the quality of the interpretation provided.33 Yet, 
these difficult judgements, especially when made by an investigating police officer at the 
police station with little linguistic expertise, should not be underestimated or thought of as 
routine matters.  
Of particular significance is Art. 5.3, which states that “Member States shall ensure 
that interpreters and translators be required to observe confidentiality regarding interpretation 
and translation provided under this Directive”. The interpreter summoned by the police in 
order to facilitate effective questioning and evidence gathering, and the interpreter required 
by the suspect to communicate effectively with their legal advisor, play different roles within 
the criminal process. Whereas the former role is obviously one which calls for competence 
                                                 
25 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 2.2. “Member States shall ensure that, where necessary for the purpose of 
safeguarding the fairness of the proceedings, interpretation is available for communication between suspected or 
accused persons and their legal counsel in direct connection with any questioning or hearing during the 
proceedings or with the lodging of an appeal or other procedural applications”. 
26 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 2.3 adds this: “The right to interpretation ...includes appropriate assistance for 
persons with hearing or speech impediments”. 
27 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 2.4: “Member States shall ensure that a procedure or mechanism is in place to 
ascertain whether suspected or accused persons speak and understand the language of the criminal proceedings 
and whether they need the assistance of an interpreter”.   
28 Even then, children can vary in their talent for language acquisition: “even when the social environment is the 
same, two children can differ in their acquisition of bilingual proficiency because of native ability”; see Barry 
McLaughlin, “The relationship between first and second languages: language proficiency and language 
aptitude”, in Birgit Harley, Patrick Allen, Jim Cummins, Merrill Swain, Michael H. Long, Jack C. Richards, 
(eds.), The Development of Second Language Proficiency (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 158-174, at 
p. 172. 
29 See, for example, John Archibald, “Second Language Acquisition” in W. O’Grady (ed.) Contemporary 
Linguistics (Longman, London, 1997), at pp. 503-539. 
30 See John Edwards, Language and Disadvantage (Arnold Publishers, London, 1989), at p. 126. 
31 See Ikuko Nakane “Problems in Communicating the Suspect's Rights in Interpreted Police Interviews” (2007) 
28 (1) Applied Linguistics, pp. 87-112. 
32 R. v. Merthyr Tydfil Justices, ex parte Jenkins [1967] 1 All E.R. 636. 
33 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 2.5: Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with procedures in national 
law, suspected or accused persons have the right to challenge a decision finding that there is no need for 
interpretation and, when interpretation has been provided, the possibility to complain that the quality of the 
interpretation is not sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. 
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and independence, the latter also creates specific duties towards the suspect, not least of 
which is that of confidentiality. The duty of confidentiality, for it to have meaning and 
purpose, must be reinforced by the protection of legal professional privilege. This is not 
explicitly stated in Art. 5, which is a significant omission. However, this should not cause 
difficulties for the law of England and Wales. In R. (on the application of Bozkurt) v Thames 
Magistrates Court, it was held that an interpreter present at an interview between a client and 
his solicitor could rely on legal professional privilege to preserve the confidentiality of the 
discussions.34 It is not clear whether or not this principle finds manifestation in the domestic 
laws of other member states. Clearly, the directive’s failure to underline its importance may 
give rise to future challenges and may lay the ground for inconsistent practices.    
Other, more practical provisions include Art. 2.6, which permits communication via 
video conferencing, telephone or the internet unless the physical presence of the interpreter is 
required in order to safeguard fairness. Although the use of technology to facilitate 
communication may at first glance appear uncontroversial, research on the use of video 
conferencing in legal contexts (compared with traditional interpreting where the interpreter is 
physically present) highlight a number of interpreting problems which could threaten the 
fairness of the proceedings.35 These include “turn-taking problems (overlapping speech)”36 
and omissions (loss of information), especially when an interpreter relies on video 
conferencing to interpret material. Interpreters have been found not to be fully aware of the 
loss of information caused by overlapping speech (as when people talk at the same time due 
to technical lag). Interpreters seem to be aware that speech coordination is often an issue and 
realise the disruption which results from speech overlaps. Those with experience of the use of 
video conferencing as a means of holding meetings, especially when there are several 
participants at a number of different locations, will have some appreciation of the 
communication problems that can arise, and of the limits of current technology. 
 
 
The Directive and the Right to Translation 
 
The criminal process is, of course, document based to a large extent, and Article 3 creates 
obligations with regard to the provision of written translation of documents used in 
connection with the proceedings. Although Art. 6 ECHR does not explicitly mention 
documents or translations thereof, European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence has upheld 
that the right of suspects and accused persons to an interpreter under Art. 6(3)(e) relates to 
both oral statements and to documents, especially in order to give effect to the rights 
contained in Art. 6.37 
 Art. 3 of the Directive states that suspects and accused persons, within a reasonable 
period of time, should be provided with translations of “all documents which are essential to 
ensure that they are able to exercise their right of defence and to safeguard the fairness of the 
proceedings”.38 It also provides that, “there shall be no requirement to translate passages of 
essential documents which are not relevant for the purposes of enabling suspected or accused 
persons to have knowledge of the case against them.”39 Article 3.7 qualifies this by allowing 
                                                 
34 R. (on the application of Bozkurt) v Thames Magistrates Court [2001] EWHC Admin. 400; [2002] R.T.R. 15 
35 Sabine Braun, “Keep your Distance? Remote Interpreting in Legal Proceedings: A Critical Assessment of a 
Growing Practice” (2013) 15 (2) Interpreting, pp. 200-228. 
36 Braun, pp. 224-226.  
37 See Kamasinski v. Austria (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 36; the right to written translations are implicit to give effect to 
the rights protected by Art. 6. (3) (a), (b), (d) and (e).  
38 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 3.1.  
39 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 3.4. 
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an oral translation or oral summary of essential documents, provided that this does not 
prejudice the fairness of the proceedings.40 
This is potentially problematic, especially in the context of police disclosure of 
documents and in the assessment of what is “essential” and “relevant” for the individual to 
know the case against them. Experience of the domestic law of England and Wales with 
regard to disclosure rules in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 should serve 
as a warning of some of the difficulties can arise when tests of relevance are applied in 
practice in determining prosecution disclosure, even where there are no language 
difficulties.41  
To add some further ambiguity to these provisions, Art. 3.2 states that, “essential 
documents shall include any decision depriving a person of his liberty, any charge or 
indictment, and any judgment”.42 There can be no doubt that these documents will be relevant 
for a suspect or defendant wishing to know the case against him, and will assist in his 
preparation of his defence (a judgment will be helpful for a convicted defendant wishing to 
prepare an appeal). But this is not an exhaustive list by any measure, and no mention is made 
of witness depositions or other evidence which may be essential for a defendant exercising 
his right of defence.  
No doubt, the authors expect member-states to have means of determining what is 
“essential” and “relevant” for a defendant exercising his right of defence, and Art. 3.3 states 
that, “the competent authorities shall, in any given case, decide whether any other document 
is essential. Suspected or accused persons or their legal counsel may submit a reasoned 
request to that effect.” Yet if promoting consistency of approach across the EU is the 
principle goal of the Directive, to leave matters in such an open-ended state can hardly be 
said to advance that objective. Would an appendix setting out a list of potentially “essential” 
documents have been too much to ask?  
The tests of essential and relevancy in Art. 3 are potentially problematic, although the 
position appears to be partly mitigated by the requirements in Art. 3.5, which requires that 
suspects should have,  
 
“…the right to challenge a decision finding that there is no need for the translation of 
documents or passages thereof and, when a translation has been provided, the 
possibility to complain that the quality of the translation is not sufficient to safeguard 
the fairness of the proceedings”.43  
 
In principle, this is plausible. In practice, a defendant would have to challenge the decision 
whilst not being able to access the document and its contents in the first place. We are left 
with a rather circuitous proposition to the effect that a suspect needs a translation before 
knowing whether or not a translation of the document is necessary. In truth, the safeguards 
can only be practical where the suspect has a legal advisor who can appreciate the 
document’s potential significance in the process and present the argument on his behalf. 
Furthermore, identifying or recognising poor quality translation and complaining about it 
may not be straightforward in the context of the police station.  Accordingly, in practice, 
qualitative defects with interpreting and translation in the police station may only emerge 
much later in the process, if at all.  
                                                 
40 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 3.7. 
41 See J. Richardson (ed.), Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2017), paras. 12-45 to 12-122.  
42 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 3.2.  
43 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 3.5. 
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Art. 3.8 deals with the scenario where the suspect, on his own accord, waives the right 
to have a translation of an essential document. Again, the application of this provision 
requires care and caution, especially in the context of vulnerable suspects.  Some protection is 
offered in that any waiver of the right to translation is subject to the requirement that legal 
advice has been received, “or have otherwise obtained full knowledge of the consequences of 
such a waiver, and that the waiver was unequivocal and given voluntarily”.44 Art. 4 
implements Art. 6(3)(e) ECHR in that “member states shall meet the costs of interpretation 
and translation resulting from the application of Art. 2 and Art. 3, irrespective of the outcome 
of the proceedings”.  
The Directive also contains a number of obligations intended to provide quality-
control mechanisms. Art. 5 maintains that the interpretation and translation must be of quality 
sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings and ensure that suspected or accused 
persons have knowledge of the case against them and are able to exercise their right of 
defence.45 As the Directive acknowledges, poor quality interpretation undermines the fairness 
of the proceedings and interferes with the individual’s understanding of the case against them 
and their capacity to mount their defence.46 As a measure to ensure quality and 
professionalism, member-states are expected to draw up a register of qualified and 
independent legal interpreters and translators that is available to lawyers and relevant 
authorities.47  
Art. 6 requires that in order to ensure efficient and effective implementation, the 
training of judges, prosecutors and judicial staff on the meaning and of the provisions of the 
Directive must be provided, with “special attention to the particularities of communicating 
with the assistance of an interpreter so as to ensure efficient and effective communication”.48 
This is to be welcomed, in principle, as past experience has shown that judges and 
prosecutors have failed to recognise defects in the interpreting process in criminal trails, 
defects which have led to unsafe convictions.49  
 
 
The Directive in Practice 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was invited to rule on the provisions of 
the Directive for the first time in October 2015 in the case of Covaci.50 The preliminary 
hearing arose in consequence of the experiences of a Romanian national who had been 
charged in Germany with driving without a valid motor insurance and having forged 
insurance documents. The matter was dealt with as a minor offence, and a penalty order was 
issued which gave the recipient two weeks within which to either accept the penalty or notify, 
in writing or orally, that he had an objection to it and thus require a trial.  
During the process it became clear that German domestic law does not offer the 
service of a free translation of a written appeal against a penalty order when it is submitted in 
a language other than the official language of the court, even if the suspect does not speak the 
                                                 
44 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 3.8.  
45 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 5.1: “Member States shall take concrete measures to ensure that the interpretation 
and translation provided meets the quality required under Article 2(8) and Article 3(9)”.  
46 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 2.8.  
47 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 5.2.  
48 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 6.  
49 See Cuscani v United Kingdom (2003) 36 E.H.R.R., 2. 
50 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Laufen (Germany) lodged on 30 April 2014 — 
Criminal proceedings against Gavril Covaci (Case C-216/14) 2014/C 253/22: see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62014CN0216 [Accessed 21 January 2017]..  
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official language. The question for the CJEU therefore was, was this practice in conflict with 
the provisions of Directive 2010/64? 51 
The CJEU concluded that the fact that domestic law in this case required the appeal to 
be drafted in German, the official language of the court, and that no translation of appeals 
submitted in foreign languages was undertaken, did not fall foul of the provisions of the EU 
Directive.52 It held that whereas Art. 3 of the Directive requires essential documents produced 
by the state to be translated into the suspect’s language, there is no requirement that 
documents submitted by the suspect in his language should be translated by the court into the 
official language, unless they are regarded by the court, exercising its discretion, as essential 
documents.53 According to the CJEU, Art. 3(2), which lists essential documents, is only 
concerned with documents produced by competent authorities, that is, the state prosecutors or 
the courts, and in Art. 3(4) the emphasis is on the accused having knowledge of the case 
against him. 
This is in contrast with the provisions of Art. 2, which deal with the interpretation of 
oral statements, and require words to be interpreted in both directions, including the suspect’s 
words into the language of the court.54 The Advocate General’s opinion pointed out this 
contradiction in the Directive, in that the suspect’s appeal would have been interpreted, in 
accordance with Art. 2, had he submitted it orally.55 As the Advocate General stated, Art. 2, 
“is applicable both in respect of statements or documents intended for the defence and in 
respect of statements or documents produced by the defence addressed to the competent 
judicial authorities”.56  
This undoubtedly highlights an inconsistency in the Directive, which on this 
interpretation makes an unprincipled and arbitrary distinction between oral and written 
submissions. To grant the assistance of an interpreter where the objection is oral but to refuse 
it when it is written is irrational. It also highlights a disparity between the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights on the purpose and scope of Art. 6 ECHR, and that of the 
CJEU on Art. 3 of the Directive. Strasbourg jurisprudence supports the view that a fair trial 
requires the translation not only of essential prosecution documents but also the defence.57 
The right to the free assistance of an interpreter applies to both oral statements and 
documentary material, including the defence case and supporting evidence.58 This is a 
disparity between the Directive and the ECHR which surely defeats the Directive’s very 
purpose.  
The CJEU attempted to offer some consolation by emphasizing that the Directive lays 
down minimum rules which member states can supplement with further safeguards by adding 
other documents to the list of essential documents not in the indicative list in Art 3(2).59 Of 
course, Art. 3.3 allows accused persons or their legal counsel to submit a reasoned request for 
                                                 
51 The CJEU was also asked for guidance on the interpretation of Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to 
information in criminal proceedings. This paper is not concerned with that specific Directive and the issues that 
arose.  
52 See Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 15 October 2015 (request for a preliminary ruling from the 
Amtsgericht Laufen — Germany) Criminal proceedings against Gavril Covaci (Case C-216/14) (2015/C 
406/06): see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62014CA0216 [Accessed 21 
January 2017]. 
53 Covaci (Case C-216/14), paras. 38 and 47.  
54 Covaci (Case C-216/14), paras. 30, 40 and 42.  
55 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, delivered on 7 May 2015: Case C-216/14 Criminal proceedings against 
Gavril Covaci: http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62014CC0216&from=EN 
[Accessed 21 January 2017]. 
56 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, 07/05/15, para 62.  
57 Kamasinski v. Austria [1989] ECHR 24, 9783/82; (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 36 
58 Kamasinski v. Austria, para 74.  
59 Covaci (Case C-216/14), paras. 48-50.  
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a document to be translated as an essential document. But, as has been already stated, such a 
“reasoned request” is in practice likely to be difficult to construct, and may not be practicable 
in circumstances where there is a short deadline in which to reply, and where legal assistance 
is neither provided nor sought.  
Advocate General Bot proposed that the right to translation should also encompass 
documents produced by the defendant in his language as part of his defence:60  
 
“In my view, there is no doubt that in so far as the assistance of an interpreter is 
guaranteed in an appeal brought orally at the registry of the competent court, such 
assistance must equally be guaranteed where the appeal is lodged in writing.”61 
The Advocate General also criticised the minimalistic approach often taken by states in 
interpreting rights directives of this kind, which, after all, “ensure the application of and 
respect for fundamental rights which are the underlying shared values that make the 
European Union a system founded on the rule of law.”62 Be that as it may. In these specific 
circumstances, only the elimination of any distinction between oral and written 
representations can satisfy the overriding objective of Article 3, which is to enable suspects to 
“exercise their right of defence and to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings”.63 
The provisions of the Directive will, no doubt, be the subject of further referrals and 
appeals in the coming years. In the more recent case of Balogh, the Regional Court of 
Budapest (Budapest Környéki Törvényszék), made a reference to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling on the interpretation of Article 1(1) of the Directive.64 The issue arose in consequence 
of Hungarian procedure for the recognition of a criminal judgment made by an Austrian court 
which had sentenced Balogh, a Hungarian national, to a prison sentence for burglary. The 
Hungarian Ministry of Justice required the Austrian judgment to be translated into Hungarian 
in order for it to be recognized as a foreign judgment. The question then arose, who should 
bear the cost of that translation?  
Hungarian law indicated that the convicted person would have to bear the cost if he 
had been responsible for the cost of the main proceedings that led to his conviction. But 
would such a requirement be in breach of Directive 2010/64? Does the Directive, which 
states that the accused is not to bear the cost of interpreting or translating, apply to the 
procedures governing the recognition of foreign judgments?  
The answer to the specific question regarding the scope and applicability of the 
Directive was that the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings applies 
from the time the suspect is made aware that he is suspected or accused of having committed 
a criminal offence until the conclusion of the proceedings, meaning the final determination of 
guilt, including sentencing and appeal stages of the process.65 The special procedure for the 
recognition of a judgement made in the court of another member state is after the final 
determination of those proceedings, and thus fall outside the provisions of the Directive.66 
However, the CJEU took on board the opinion of Advocate General Bot,67 who 
questioned the legality of the special process initiated by the Hungarian authorities on the 
                                                 
60 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, 07/05/15, paras. 81 and 119. 
61 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, 07/05/15, para 80.  
62 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, 07/05/15, para 32.  
63 Directive 2010/64/EU, Art. 3.1.  
64 C-25/15 – Balogh: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 9 June 2016: ECLI:EU:C:2016:423 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-25/15 [Accessed 21 January 2017]. 
65 C-25/15 – Balogh, para. 36. 
66 C-25/15 – Balogh, para 37. 
67 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, delivered on 20 January 2016, Case C-25/15: Criminal proceedings against 
István Balogh. 
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grounds that it was contrary to Council Framework Decision 2009/315 on the smooth and 
expeditious exchange of information on criminal records between Member States, and 
Council Decision 2009/316 on the establishment of the European Criminal Records 
Information System (ECRIS). In other words, the need for recourse to the recognition of 
foreign judgements special procedure was indicative of a failure by Hungary to implement 
properly the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), and was contrary to 
other provisions governing the principle of mutual recognition.68 Had the ECRIS mechanism 
been in place, an automatic translation would have provided sufficient detail for entering the 
conviction in the record of the convicted person’s member state.69  
 There are aspects of the ruling in Balogh which are therefore sui generis and do not 
affect the application of Directive 2010/64 as such. That said, the ruling highlights the 
potential for certain elements of the criminal process to fall outside the ambit of the Directive. 
Would the Directive apply in proceedings reviewing the early release of prisoners, or 
reviewing minimum tariffs for prisoners serving custodial sentences, for example? Would it 
apply to post-sentencing proceedings dealing with seizure or forfeiture of assets or the 
proceedings of crime? Would proceedings that review miscarriages of justice which are held 
many years after the initial trial proceedings had concluded, fall within the ambit of the 
Directive? It may require a further referral to the CJEU for the answers to some of these 
questions to be made clear.  
 Although there have not been any referrals to the CJEU on the implementation of the 
Directive in the UK, its provisions are posing considerable challenges for effective 
implementation. The law of England and Wales recognised the right to translation and 
interpretation in a criminal trial in circumstances where a defendant does not speak English 
long before the advent of the Human Rights Act 1998.70 But the practical and proper 
implementation of that right has proved to be more challenging, such as in Cuscani v United 
Kingdom,71 where the European Court of Human Rights held that there had been a breach of 
Arts. 6(1) and 6(3) (e) when there had been a failure properly to assess the need for a 
competent interpreter by relying on the untested linguistic skills of the defendant’s brother.72 
In R. (on the application of Gashi) v Chief Adjudicator (Need for Competent Interpreter),73 it 
was held that there is a duty on the judge to ensure both the competence of the interpreter and 
the quality of interpretation. But in R v. Mihaly Ungvari,74 however, it was held that the 
interpreter need not be registered with the National Register of Public Service Interpreters 
provided that he was sufficiently competent. 
 These cases pre-date the Directive. When the Directive came into force, the PACE 
1984 Codes of Practice, Code C specifically, were amended so that domestic law and practice 
could be compatible with it.75 The required amendments, in principle, seemed to cause little 
or no consternation when they were introduced. Among them were provisions stating that 
chief police officers are responsible for ensuring that qualified and independent interpreters 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d53961fa4e3d404b3aae0792bff8f988
33.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4Pah0Re0?text=&docid=173624&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=101019 [Accessed 21 January 2017]. 
68 C-25/15 – Balogh, paras 52 and 57.  
69 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, 20/01/16, paras. 62-3.  
70 See R. v. Lee Kun [1916] 1 K.B. 337; also R. v. Iqbal Begum (1989) 93 Cr. App. R. 96. 
71 (2003) 36 E.H.R.R., 2.  
72 See further commentary in [2003] Crim. L. R., 50. 
73 R. (on the application of Gashi) v Chief Adjudicator (Need for Competent Interpreter) [2001] EWCH Admin 
916; The Times 12 November 2001 
74 R v. Mihaly Ungvari [2003] EWCA Crim 2346. 
75 See Explanatory Memorandum to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revisions 
to Codes A, B, C, E, F and H) Order 2013: 2013 No. 2685, para 4.7. 
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are available for suspects or detained persons, and for providing translations of essential 
documents.76 Other amendments ensured that there must be procedures in place to determine 
if the assistance of an interpreter is needed,77 and to take appropriate action where the 
detained person complains about the quality of the interpretation or translation.78 
Therefore, on the face of things, the Directive’s provisions have already been 
embedded in the law of England and Wales. This makes the call in the report of the All Party 
Parliamentary Group on Modern Languages for legislation to replicate the Directive appear 
otiose, at least at first glance. However, shortly before and since the Directive came into 
force, there have been concerns with its effective implementation.79 In particular, concerns 
with the quality of court interpretation and translation have been the subject of both public 
and professional disquiet, and even parliamentary scrutiny.80 For example, the Ministry of 
Justice’s outsourcing of interpreting and translation services to Capita Translation and 
Interpreting Ltd has been a source of political anxiety.81 Even the attention of the higher 
courts has been engaged. Although in R. v Applied Language Solutions Ltd (now Capita 
Translation and Interpreting Ltd),82 the Court of Appeal held that Capita was not guilty of 
serious misconduct when it failed to provide an interpreter for a particular crown court 
sentencing hearing, it also emphasised that the provision of a competent interpreter where a 
witness or a defendant did not speak English was essential for a fair trial.  
In July 2012 the House of Commons Justice Committee began an inquiry on the 
provision of interpreting and translation services in the courts.83 It concluded in its published 
report that the Ministry of Justice had failed to procure an appropriate model for the delivery 
of the interpreting services required by the courts, and that the arrangements then in place 
were not fit for purpose.84 There was an insufficient number of appropriately qualified 
interpreters to meet the demand. Court adjournments due to problems with court interpreting 
were commonplace.85 This highlighted what was in the context of language rights in the 
criminal courts a schism between language rights in principle and their practical 
implementation, a schism between policy and delivery. Yet one should not underestimate the 
scale of the task. In the context of the same debate it was recognised that, “we are talking 
about a system with some 800 requests a day for such interpretation. In the first quarter of its 
operation there were 26,000 requests in 142 languages”.86  
The Justice Committee concluded its review with a recommendation that there should 
be an independent regulation of law interpreters in order to develop capacity, raise standards 
and ensure appropriate training and remuneration, also recommending “there should be a 
regulation system that is independently organised to select and classify interpreters for the 
                                                 
76 PACE 1984, Code C 13.1. 
77 PACE 1984, Code C, Note for Guidance 13B.  
78 PACE 1984, Code C 13.10A and 13.10C.  
79 See The Guardian, 4 May 2016.  
80 For comment, see R. Gwynedd Parry, “The Curse of Babel and the Criminal Process” [2014] Crim. L. R. 802.  
81 Parliamentary Debates - House of Lords’ Official Report of Proceedings (Hansard), 9 July 2012, col. 908: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/120709-0001.htm [Accessed 21 January 
2017]. 
82 R. v Applied Language Solutions Ltd (now Capita Translation and Interpreting Ltd) [2013] EWCA Crim 326. 
83 House of Commons Justice Committee, Interpreting and translation services and the Applied Language 
Solutions Contract, HC 645, 6 February 2013 (T.S.O., London, 2013). 
84 House of Commons Justice Committee, Interpreting and translation services and the Applied Language 
Solutions Contract, p.79. 
85 See also a report in The Guardian, 4 May 2016.  
86 Parliamentary Debates - House of Lords’ Official Report of Proceedings (Hansard), 9 July 2012, col. 908: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/120709-0001.htm [Accessed 21 January 
2017]. 
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appropriate level of court and tribunal work”.87 This is a recommendation that has hitherto 
not been adopted, and the Ministry of Justice recently awarded the contract to an alternative 
service provider.88 If Brexit leads to the loss of the Directive, it is most unlikely that this 
recommendation will be adopted at all. After all, the Directive’s provisions currently carry 
with them the threat of infringement proceedings before the CJEU where there is failure to 
comply. Without the Directive, there may be less of an incentive to raise standards and thus 
ensure that language rights in criminal proceedings are supported by a robust professional 
infrastructure.  
 
 
The Directive in Context 
 
There are a number of international instruments that are, to varying degrees, concerned with 
the safeguarding of language rights, including language rights in criminal proceedings. To 
what extent are the Directive’s provisions distinctive? Is it the case that they are they 
replicated in other instruments? The issue here is the degree to which the Directive is 
indispensable.  
On the global stage, the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights is silent on the 
specific issue of language rights.89 The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which has legal force, declares that linguistic minorities should not be denied the right 
to use their own language. But the actual scope of that right is uncertain, and there is certainly 
no reference to criminal process specifically.90 Less relevant to this paper, perhaps, because 
of its specific remit, is the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.91 Among its 
provisions are language rights for indigenous peoples, and Art. 13 explicitly refers to 
linguistic rights, stating that, “indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop 
and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, 
writing systems and literatures”. Art. 13 also declares that states shall “ensure that indigenous 
peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal and administrative proceedings, 
where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other appropriate means”. 
Other UN instruments which uphold language rights either lack detail or legal force.92 All in 
all, the UN is not a source of much substance on this subject.  
We must therefore return towards the European context. In addition to the ECHR, 
there exists a range of European instruments which seek to promote language rights. It is not 
surprising that the EU is taking multilingualism seriously if its goal of full political and social 
harmonisation is to be realised.93 The EU’s evolving language policy is the product of a 
combination of factors. The most obvious is its historical demography, in that the EU is 
composed of historical, organic nations with their own traditional languages.94 
                                                 
87 House of Commons Justice Committee, Interpreting and translation services and the Applied Language 
Solutions contract, p. 84.  
88 The Law Society Gazette, 16 August 2016.  
89 Compared with The Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights, and instrument that has not been ratified by 
the UN General Assembly.  Article 20 of the UDLR states that “everyone has the right, in all cases, to be tried in 
a language which he/she understands and can speak and to obtain the services of an interpreter free of charge”. 
90 ICCPR, Art. 27 
91 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN General Assembly Resolution 61/295.  
92 For example, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities is devoted to protect the rights of minority cultures, including linguistic 
dimensions, but it lacks detail.  
93 See, further, Anne Lise Kjaer and Silvia Adamo (eds.), Linguistic Diversity and European Democracy 
(Ashgate, Farnham, 2011).  
94 The challenges of managing the demands of multilingualism in the context of criminal proceedings are, of 
course, global in extent. See, for example, D. Mildren, “Redressing the Imbalance: Aboriginal People in the 
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Multilingualism, of course, runs deeper than the inter-state level, and native or indigenous 
linguistic plurality is an internal cultural feature of almost all the sovereign member states.95 
Even member states with a tradition of promoting linguistic homogeneity have gradually, if 
reluctantly, acknowledged their inherent and historical multilingualism.96 Of course, language 
law and policy which apply within the devolved nations of the UK can sometimes vary, with 
law providing that the Welsh language has official status in Wales and has equal status with 
English within the courts of law in Wales.97  
 But the multilingual EU is not merely the product of its more ancient historical and 
cultural legacy. It is also the legacy of recent colonial history and a century of immigration 
from former colonies. There is hardly a European state without well-established linguistic 
communities whose origins are in Asia or Africa and who were once subject to the authority 
of a European imperial power. Add to this the EU’s own policies that have facilitated free 
movement of individuals within the union, which have also led to the creation of new, if 
sometimes temporary, linguistic communities across the EU.98  
Protecting the linguistic rights of indigenous, immigrant and migrant citizens forms an 
objective of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which articulates the core values of 
the EU in a consolidating instrument.99 Art. 21 of the Charter prevents discrimination on the 
grounds of language or where an individual is a member of a national minority. Art. 21.1 
states that “any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall 
be prohibited”. Art. 22 also states that, “the Union shall respect cultural, religious and 
linguistic diversity.”  
The Charter of Fundamental Rights thus protects linguistic minorities by preventing 
discriminatory behaviour against them, and to an extent is in the spirit of the ECHR.  As an 
EU instrument, like the Directive, it potentially engages the jurisdiction of the CJEU in cases 
of discrimination. The Lisbon Treaty gives binding legal effect to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.100 However, although the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Arts. 47-50 deals with 
criminal proceedings, it is silent on the matter of language rights in those proceedings. In 
short, it does not advance the specific cause of language rights in criminal proceedings. Art. 3 
of the Treaty on European Union declares that the EU “shall respect its rich cultural and 
linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Criminal Justice System” (1999) 6 (1) Forensic Linguistics: the International Journal of Speech, Language and 
the Law, pp. 137-160; J. Carroll, “The Use of Interpreters in Court” (1995) 2 (1) Forensic Linguistics: the 
International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law, pp. 65-73; C. Lane , K. McKenzie-Bridle And L. 
Curtis, “The Right to Interpreting and Translation Services in New Zealand Courts” (1999) 6 (1) Forensic 
Linguistics: the International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law , pp. 115-136. 
95 See Niamh Nic Shuibhne, EC Law and Minority Language Policy: Culture, Citizenship and Fundamental 
Rights (Kluwer, The Hague, 2002). 
96 The United Kingdom, for example, has made knowledge of Scots Gaelic, English or Welsh necessary to 
satisfy the linguistic test for British naturalisation: see British Nationality Act 1981, s. 6(1), Schedule 1, 
paragraph 1(C).  
97 See Welsh Language Act 1993, s.5 (2), s. 22: see also Welsh Language Measure (Wales) 2011, s.1. 
98 As the procedural rights roadmap which led to the creation of the Directive acknowledged: “...the removal of 
internal borders and the increasing exercise of the rights to freedom of movement and residence have, as an 
inevitable consequence, led to an increase in the number of people becoming involved in criminal proceedings 
in a Member State other than that of their residence. In those situations, the procedural rights of suspected or 
accused persons are particularly important in order to safeguard the right to a fair trial.” Resolution of the EU 
Council on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal 
proceedings, 30 November 2009 (2009/C 295/01), Preamble, para. 3.  
99 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (2007/C 303/01). 
100 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01. 
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enhanced”. But the Treaty is short on detail and does not advance the cause of linguistic 
diversity in the courts of law.   
Although there is increasing activity in the sphere of language rights on the part of the 
EU, it would be true to say that it is following a path already set by the Council of Europe in 
minority language promotion and protection. In addition to the ECHR’s provisions, the 
Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM) protects individual language rights within the broader context of minority rights.101 
Art. 10(3) FCNM requires party states to guarantee the right of an individual to be informed 
in a language that he or she understands, the reasons for his or her arrest and the nature of the 
accusation, and to be able to defend himself or herself in that language (if necessary, with the 
assistance of an interpreter). But Art. 10(3) FCNM is no more than a paraphrase of Art. 6 
ECHR, in that it guarantees the right to understand court proceedings, but does not promote 
language choice.102 The FCNM is also limited in application to “national minorities”, 
whereas the ECHR is universal in application.103   
Art. 6 ECHR guarantees the right to comprehension on the basis of linguistic 
necessity as part of the basic requirements of a fair trial. But it does not guarantee any right to 
language choice, or the right to a tribunal who speaks the defendant’s language.104 It 
recognises a principle of linguistic necessity in the interests of trial fairness, no more, no 
less.105 Another Council of Europe treaty, the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (ECRML), takes a different approach. It is exclusively concerned with linguistic 
rights, and requires states to implement various measures to promote the interests of minority 
languages in the fields of education, law, public administration, media, culture, and economic 
and social life.106 Art. 9 ECRML requires states, in appropriate circumstances, to allow 
defendants, witnesses and all parties who speak the minority language to use it in court and 
tribunal hearings.107  
More significantly, it contains provisions which, if adopted by states parties, require 
criminal courts, at the request of one of the parties, to conduct proceedings in the minority or 
regional language108 and guarantee the accused the right to use his or her minority 
                                                 
101 For commentary, see Marc Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
102 For further commentary, see see R. Gwynedd Parry, “The Languages of Evidence” [2004] Crim.L.R 1015. 
103 The expression “national minorities” is not defined by the Framework Convention: see Weller, The Rights of 
Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 
at pp. 16-19, and 82-85.  
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(1984) 35 D.R. 203.  
105 See Fryske Nasjonale Partij and Others v. Netherlands (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. C.D. 261.  
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‘Linguistic Diversity, Human Rights and the Free Market’, in M. Kontra, R. Phillipson, T. Skutnabb-Kangas 
and T. Varady (eds.) Language: A Right and a Resource (CEU Press, Budapest, 1999) pp. 187-222; Alba 
Nogueira, Eduardo J. Ruiz Vieytez and Iñigo Urrutia (eds.), Shaping Language Rights: a Commentary on the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in light of the Committee of Experts' evaluation (Council 
of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2012). 
107 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, (ECRML), Part III, Art. 9.  
108 ECRML, Art. 9, para. 1 (a) (i). 
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language.109 According to the ECRML, the use of the minority language is facilitated, if 
necessary, by the use of interpreters and translation.110  
Art. 9 ECRML, if adopted by the signatory state, offers linguistic choice to the 
speaker of the minority language, and is not limited to the rights of suspects or defendants. 
But the ECRML is limited in application to “historical languages, that is to say languages 
which have been spoken over a long period in the state in question”.111 Article 1 states that 
the languages to which the ECRML applies are those which are spoken by a minority, are 
traditionally used by part of the population of a state, and which are not official languages, 
languages of migrants, dialects or artificially created languages.112  
Leaving aside some of the controversies surrounding the interpretation of these 
expressions, it is clear that the ECRML is designed to protect “the historical regional or 
minority languages of Europe”, and supports “the maintenance and development of Europe's 
cultural wealth and traditions’.113 The languages of new linguistic communities or individuals 
who happen to be visiting another member state at the time of their arrest, for example, do 
not come under its remit.114 The ECRML is an instrument which goes further than other 
fundamental rights instruments and offers a blueprint for citizen rights to those language 
groups which fall under its remit. But the fact that it applies only to specific languages, that 
states enjoy considerable discretion in adopting its provisions, and that it lacks legal bite 
means that its true impact may, in truth, be limited.115As a Council of Europe instrument, it 
is, of course, not impacted by Brexit.  
When the international legal landscape is surveyed, we find that the language rights in 
criminal proceedings that are protected by the ECHR, and which the Directive seeks to 
implement, are not replicated in other instruments. We cannot turn to other, alternative legal 
sources for comparable provisions which carry the same universal application and legal force. 
An appreciation of this context is important as the future of the Directive’s implementation in 
the UK is being considered.  
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article began by asking, what would be lost if the Directive on the Right to 
Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings’ was to cease to have effect in the 
UK? There are a number of observations that can be made in concluding.  
As has been noted, the Directive does not introduce new standards or create further 
language rights over and above those contained in the ECHR. It certainly does not advance 
the case for linguistic choice in criminal proceedings. Then again, there are very few 
                                                 
109 ECRML, para. 1 (a) (ii). 
110 ECRML, Part I, Art. 1, para. (b). 
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instruments which guarantee language choice, and those that do tend not to be in the tradition 
of universal human rights. The Directive is simply a tool to promote common practices 
within the EU in the observance of the fundamental language rights that are already protected 
under the ECHR. It is an attempt to set common standards and to embed language rights 
observance within the criminal justice processes of EU member states. It also provides 
guidance on interpreting the provisions of Arts. 5 and 6 ECHR, by setting out the practical 
measures required for the language rights to be fully and consistently implemented.  
But there are definitional issues with the Directive, some of which have been exposed 
in the recent judgements of the CJEU. Its provisions, when subjected to close scrutiny have 
been shown to be unclear, inconsistent and inadequate. Indeed, in some respects it has been 
shown to fall short of the protection already offered in European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence. Even in its purported virtue, which is its practical checklist of measures to 
comply with ECHR principles, it falls short of what is required to actually achieve common 
practice. Too much scope for differing interpretations of its provisions and for latitude in 
application means that true harmonisation is, and probably always was, a tall order. Perhaps 
the Directive is justified in this regard on the grounds that it strives to ensure compliance with 
minimum standards without precluding state parties’ capacity to offer more extensive levels 
of protection if they so choose.116 But it remains the case that the Directive may ultimately 
not live up to expectations.  
It is therefore arguable that the plea made by the All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Modern Languages for the Directive to be implemented into domestic law over-estimates the 
Directive’s value and impact, and overlooks potential defects in its construction. It also 
overlooks the fact that, in any event, Code C of PACE 1984 replicates the same language 
rights as a result of having been amended to ensure its compatibility with the Directive. 
Significantly, since the Directive has come into force, there have been no referrals from the 
UK to the CJEU.  
As the rights protected by the Directive are protected by the ECHR, some might also 
argue that an application to the European Court of Human Rights would remain a potential 
avenue of appeal in the event of violations. However, this is predicated on the UK continuing 
to remain a signatory to the ECHR, and the status of the ECHR in domestic law is conditional 
on the fact that the Human Rights Act 1998 does not become another one of the casualties of 
Brexit.117 It must also be noted that the 1998 Act states that domestic courts are required to 
“take into account” any judgment, decision, declaration or opinion of the European Court of 
Human Rights, even though the “mirror principle” hitherto favoured by the Supreme Court 
has promoted a more deferential attitude to Strasbourg jurisprudence.118 However, the 
judgments of the CJEU are binding on the domestic courts of EU members, and, accordingly, 
the Directive has potentially more direct legal clout. Of course, with Brexit, both the 
Directive and the ECHR’s legal force may either be eliminated or significantly diminished.  
Despite apparent compliance with the Directive in the PACE 1984 Codes of Practice, 
meeting the demands laid down by the Directive has posed challenges for the UK, in terms of 
resources, expertise and cost.119 For language rights to be implemented properly, there must 
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be a sufficient corps of qualified translators and interpreters. Therein lies the rub. If the 
Directive were to cease to have effect, despite its shortcomings, there would be one less 
weapon in the language rights armoury to put pressure on the government to take language 
rights seriously in the criminal courts by ensuring adequate funding and resources. Indeed, 
without the Directive, the UK government may in the future dilute, with impunity, the 
language rights currently protected in Code C of PACE 1984. Such a dilution would be a 
predictable reaction to the expense incurred in maintaining the necessary professional 
infrastructure, especially qualified and competent interpreters, to honour those rights.  
In concluding, language rights would be less certain of their place in the criminal 
process without the Directive. An example of being damned by faint praise, perhaps, but this 
is probably the truest verdict.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
